O próximo desafio: o monopólio de Rare Earth Elements (REEs)

As China’s domestic consumption of rare earths grows, the country will be increasingly reliant on imports to feed its appetite for the materials. China already became the world’s largest importer of rare earths in 2018, and it is expected to become a net importer by the middle of the decade. Under these conditions, Beijing’s influence over the global rare earth industry would be significantly reduced, and new players might finally find themselves able to compete

https://chinapower.csis.org/china-rare-earths/

2014

China lost an appeal at the World Trade Organization in a case brought by the United States, the European Union and Japan to challenge China’s restrictions on exports of rare earths, according to a WTO Appellate Body ruling published on Thursday.

“... China has not demonstrated that the export quotas that China applies to various forms of rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum by virtue of the series of measures at issue are justified ... ” the document’s conclusion said.

China produces more than 90 percent of the world’s rare earths, which are key elements in defense industry components and modern technology from iPhones and disk drives to wind turbines. It imposed strict export quotas in 2010, saying it was trying to curtail pollution and preserve resources.

China’s defeat at the WTO was widely expected after it lost a similar case over exports of other commodities. It will now be obliged to cancel its export quotas to abide by the WTO ruling.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-wto-rareearths-idUSKBN0G71QD20140807

JUl21

liderança da CHINA

The single largest use of rare earths is in the manufacture of permanent magnets used in wind turbines, the drive train of hybrid and electric vehicles, and energy-efficient applications, and currently accounts for 29% of total global demand for REEs, says David Merriman, an expert on rare earths at Roskill. “As we transition to a low-carbon global economy, the demand for permanent magnets will only grow and is expected to reach about 40% of total demand for rare earths by the end of the decade,” he said.
The REEs are a group of chemically similar elements also used extensively in the aerospace, defence, and electronics industries.
According to Merriman, there are two overarching trends in rare earths markets. The first is the growth in demand from magnet applications, particularly neodymium-iron-boron magnets, which offer the highest magnetic field per unit of volume, and the second is China’s dominance of the industry.
In 2020, Chinese mines produced 110,000 tonnes of rare earths, which is more than 55% of total global mining output, he said. “Although there is expected to be a slight drop off in production to about 100,000 tonnes in 2022, production from China is forecast to remain relatively flat until the end of the decade.”

China produced 85% of the world’s rare earths refined products in 2020, but with Chinese domestic output leveling off, imports of rare earths to China are forecast to grow to 80,000 tonnes per year by 2030, up from an estimated 60,000 tonnes in 2021, Merriman said.China not only dominates the supply of rare earths but also demand, he noted, with 70% of global production consumed within the Chinese domestic market

https://www.mining.com/china-continues-dominance-of-rare-earths-markets-to-2030-says-roskill/

April21

RESPOSTA USA

The United States has made previous attempts to reemerge as a dominant player in a rare earths supply chain that is responsible for some of the most important materials involved in electric vehicle production, battery making, renewable energy systems and technology manufacturing. Under the Biden administration, the effort is receiving renewed focus, with massive investments planned in climate change technology and a hard line being taken on geopolitical rivalries and the national security threat posed by China.

In 2019, China was responsible for 80% of rare earths imports, according to the U.S. Geological Survey, although exports fell last year in part due to Covid-19.

President Biden’s sweeping $2 trillion infrastructure legislation seeks to remake the power and transportation markets in the U.S. and rebuild the country’s semiconductor industry. It follows Biden signing an executive order in February designed to review gaps in the domestic supply chains for rare earths, medical devices, chips and other key resources, and in March the Department of Energy announcing a $30 million initiative that will tap into researching and securing the U.S. domestic supply chain for rare earths and other important minerals in battery-making such as cobalt and lithium.

Success is dependent on whether the U.S. can quickly scale up processing and refining after the mining of the resources, and compete on cost with a magnet-making and processing market that’s heavily dominated by China.

In a recent interview with CNBC following the UAE’s Regional Climate Dialogue, Kerry addressed the president’s $2 trillion infrastructure proposal in relation to rivalry with China. The legislation includes $35 billion for climate research and innovation, $46 billion in renewable energy manufacturing and $174 billion to boost the electric vehicle market. China, which accounts for roughly 30% of carbon dioxide emissions globally, claims it plans to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2060 and outspent the U.S. roughly 2-to-1 on energy transition-related investments in the last decade, according to Bloomberg New Energy Finance data. 

“I think that this is a huge economic opportunity, not just for the United States, with people all around the world,” Kerry said. “This is not about China, this is not a counter to China. This is about China, the United States, India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Australia, a bunch of countries that are emitting a pretty sizable amount, the United States and China the most.” 

 CONTEXTO /LIDERANÇA CHINA

While China is dominant now, in the decades before the 1980s it was the U.S. that held a majority stake in this metals market. That changed as production growth abroad and mounting environmental pressures at home shifted production overseas and also offered cheaper labor costs. According to one 2018 report from the Department of Defense, China “strategically flooded the global market” with rare earths at cheaper prices to drive out and deter current and future competitors. 

In recent years, the Las Vegas-headquartered company received a myriad of grants and contracts from the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to research and improve domestic capabilities. One of the company’s largest customers is Shenghe Resources, a Chinese company responsible for processing, distributing and refining, which also owns a stake in the company. The connection raised some concerns among DOE scientists, according to Reuters, but government funding has continued for a rare earths separation facility.

Shenghe Resources distributes the concentrate produced at Mountain Pass to refiners in Asia, “capabilities that simply do not exist at scale in the West,” according to an MP Materials spokesman.

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/17/the-new-us-plan-to-rival-chinas-dominance-in-rare-earth-metals.html aprbil21

 2013

After top producer China decided in 2010 to tighten its export quotas for rare earth elements (REE), major customers feared being cut off from the valuable metals. The trade dispute intensified when the EU, the USA, and Japan brought the case before the WTO. The export controls raise questions about China’s intentions and strategies. This article argues that China’s export policy should not be viewed in isolation. The export controls are embedded in a greater transformation of the strategic REE industry. Beijing promotes a broad set of policies, including industry reorganization, resource conservation, and environmental protection. Next, the article examines three narratives that may be constitutive of the Chinese policy. Findings indicate that the geopolitical narrative, which sees natural resources as instruments of power politics, can be only partly attributed to China’s REE policies. The major driving motives are domestic concerns for resource conservation and environmental protection, as well as the development of competitive downstream industries. JostWübbeke Environmental Policy Research Centre, Free University of Berlin, Germany https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S030142071300041X 

mai21

China has an alarming level of control over the global supply of Rare Earth Elements (REEs). Not only is it one of the largest extractors of REEs, but it is also one of the few global destinations which processes REEs and alsotransforms them into finished products. It is this de-facto monopoly which China can weaponize and leverage against its adversaries

Deng Xiaoping famously remarked, “The Middle-East has oil, China has Rare Earths”. China went all-in on REEs when the world was pulling out. The mining, separation and refining of Rare Earths are energy intensive, requires huge economic investments, and are environmentally polluting. Most countries in the 1970s and 1980s opted out of these due to various constraints, and this withdrawal coincided with China’s increased interest in REEs, where the mining and processing were not shackled down by any of the aforementioned constraints. From 1990 to 2000, China’s REE and REM related production grew by 450%, with the United States depending on China for almost 80% of its Rare Earth needs. It is then not a coincidence that China today is a leader in the fields of smartphone manufacturing, electric vehicles, and renewable energy infrastructure. Like the erstwhile colonial powers and enterprises of Europe, China acquires raw materials, processes them, and exports value-added finished products to the US and other countries.

China’s monopoly on the global production and supply of RareEarths can be narrowed down to four factors. First, China banned foreign companies from taking part in its supply chain, except in the form of joint ventures by state-owned companies. Secondly, China exercised strict price control. Thirdly, most companies were merged into larger corporations, and new licenses for exploitation were banned, thereby keeping the extraction and supply in check. Finally, China introduced production and export quotas.China, in addition, is undertaking foreign acquisition in other parts of the world and it is an important strategy for the country to maintain its strong hold over the supply chain.

China’s quasi-monopoly was a concern amongst national security experts, but it came to the centre stage during aconfrontation between China and Japan in 2010 over the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands. In retaliation, China halted its Rare Earth exports to Japan, despite Japan being the main buyer of Chinese Rare Earths. Japan uses Rare Earths in hybrid vehicles, solar panels and in general is dependent on imports due to a lack of resources. This weaponization of resource monopoly rang alarm bells in Japan and the US as they took China to the WTO and looked for alternative supplies.

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/china-monopolizing-rare-earth-supply-chain-using-tool-coercion